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Cutting through the fourth wall: the violence of home invasion in Michael 
Haneke’s Funny Games 
 
I am convinced we have a degree of delight, and that no small one, in 
the real misfortunes and pains of others 





 A slim, dark-haired youth moves into the frame. The camera pans with him as 
he walks into a kitchen. He opens a fridge and picks out ingredients. We hear the 
noise of motor racing from an off-screen television. The character is dressed all in 
white: white sneakers, socks, shorts and a long-sleeved top. There is a sense of 
disquiet. The white cotton gloves seem out-of-place (Douglas, 1966). Surely the 
whiteness of the gloves will be spoilt through contact with the food? The character 
looks off-camera and calls ‘can I get anyone anything?’ He is answered with the 
percussive boom of a shotgun. The youth makes his selection and crosses the kitchen 
to assemble his sandwich. Whilst he butters the bread, we hear the drone of the cars 
from the television. The noise of hyper-ventilating joins it. We hear a struggle. 





 The above is a description of a key sequence that comes approximately an 
hour into Michael Haneke’s 1997 film Funny Games, as well as the almost shot-for-
shot remake Funny Games U.S. (2007). I highlight it here as it demonstrates the 
confluence of themes and ideas that I wish to discuss: the irruption of violence within 
quotidian domestic space and its cinematic representation. To a large extent, these are 
the themes that Haneke has returned to repeatedly (Wheatley 2009). Or, with slightly 
different emphasis, McCann and Sorfa (2011: 3) describe the three tenets of Haneke’s 
on-going cinematic project as being concerned with ‘ethics, audience, and power’. 
Each of these underpin the coming discussion. 
 
Funny Games and Funny Games U.S. both lend themselves to an analysis 
through the broad framework of Picart and Greek’s (2007) ‘gothic criminology’. This 
seeks to examine the construction of the monstrous and/or criminal “Other” within the 
social imaginary. For Murdock (1997 cited in Kimber 2011: 56), we can look to genre 
films as ‘symbolic lagoons of social fears’. In dredging and filtering these particular  
“lagoons”, we can see how Haneke plays with genre convention yet also draws upon 
contemporary depictions of the monstrous that is without ‘mythic origin’ (Colavito 
2008: 380). More narrowly, I examine the ways in which the presence of an 
antagonistic Other within the home prompts an uncanny blurring of boundaries. As 
such, I look to both Derridean notions of hospitality and the enforced intimacy of 
Grand Guignol theatre to unpack the ways in which the violence of the unknown (and 
unknowable) Other in Funny Games problematizes the space of the home, as well as 
that of the film itself. Indeed, there are two invasions in Funny Games; the first within 
the diegetic world and the second within the situated viewing experience of the 
audience.   
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 The structure of this article is akin to a dolly shot arranged by an omnipotent 
cinematographer. An initial close-up on the smallest, mundane details (the making of 
a sandwich) leans-back to reveal the home, family and antagonists in a medium shot. 
The camera pulls back further to puncture the television screen and take in the living 
room of the viewer. It then settles on the open DVD case of Funny Games that rests 
on top of a well-thumbed copy of Cahiers du Cinema (with a copy of Fangoria lurking 
between its covers). Or, to put this slightly more coherently, we move from a tight 
focus on the text of Funny Games before examining the effect within and outside the 
text of its fourth wall-breaking. We then finish by looking at Funny Games as a 
cinematic product. 
 
A brief synopsis should prove useful at this point. Funny Games (1997) begins 
with a family (husband Georg, wife Anna, son Schorschi1 and dog Rolfi) on their way 
to their lakeside holiday home. The diegetic classical soundtrack – part of a guessing 
game that the family play on the car stereo – is violently interrupted by the extra-
diegetic score of John Zorn’s industrial piece ‘Bonehead’ and the opening blood red 
credits. Before getting to the house, they have a stilted conversation with their 
neighbours. They notice a figure that they do not know, dressed entirely in white, 
stood next to the couple. They drive on. As the husband and son ready the family’s 
boat on the lake, the wife prepares a meal. Schorschi interrupts her; there is someone 
at the screen door at the rear of the house. A teenager, dressed in white, says that he 
has come on behalf of the family that they had seen earlier. He asks to borrow some 
eggs. He drops them. He asks for more. He drops those. The wife becomes 
increasingly irritated. Another – similarly dressed – youth joins them. They are called 
Peter and Paul. The wife asks them to leave. The husband and son return. The 
husband, initially confused by his wife’s reaction, asks the boys to leave. There is a 
brief scuffle and the husband is hit across the leg with a golf club. The funny games 
begin. A game of “hot or cold” reveals that Rolfi has been killed. In a dark mirror of 
the earlier sequence, Ann – stood alongside Paul - has a stilted conversation with a 
second set of neighbours at the lake’s edge. The antagonists place a wager with the 
family (and the audience): each member of the family will be dead by nine the 
following morning. The boys play “cat in the bag” by placing a cushion cover over 
the son’s head. Later, the boy escapes. He swims and runs to the house of the family 
that they had seen first. He finds their bodies, including that of their child. He is 
recaptured. The teenagers play “eenie meanie” and Schorschi is shot in front of his 
parents. A game of “the loving wife” precedes the husband being stabbed and then 
shot. There is a sequence just prior to the shooting of Georg when Anna grabs a 
shotgun (helpfully foreshadowed earlier in the film according to genre convention) 
and shoots Peter. Paul scrambles for the family’s remote control and then rewinds the 
film. The action spools backwards. The cathartic act of revenge is unmade. The film 
begins again. Now Paul grabs the shotgun before Anna. The wife is drowned at eight 
the following morning (earlier than planned since the boys have grown hungry). The 
film ends with Peter and Paul arriving at the house of the second family that Paul had 
spoken to earlier.   
 
Provocatively, Haneke (cited in Sorfa 2006: 93) said of Funny Games that 
‘[a]nybody who leaves the cinema doesn’t need the film, and anybody who stay does’. 
Clearly this speaks to the ethical response that Haneke hopes to prompt. However, as 
I argue here, the film is at its most effective in a domestic context. It is not that we 
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choose to leave a cinema, rather the aperture between film and home is punctured. 
The viewer’s domestic space is invaded.  
 
Following the structure outlined above, it is time to pull focus onto the 
domestic and the interplay between the protagonists and antagonists within the home.  
 
 
MEDIUM SHOT: Hospitality and ‘that unbearable orb of intimacy that melts 
into hate’ 
 
 It is often the case within the genre that ‘home invasion’ is a misnomer. Far 
from ‘invading’ – initially at least – the antagonists are welcomed into the home by 
the protagonists. They are given hospitality. They are brought close within the safety 
of the domestic. When the conditions of the proffered hospitality change, so it is that 
the protagonists attempt to eject or remove the antagonists. Perhaps ‘home defence’ 
would be more fitting. It is worth exploring the issues surrounding the giving of 
hospitality before seeing how that curdles. In Funny Games, the first antagonist is 
welcomed in. Shortly afterwards - once the eggs have been dropped repeatedly – 
Anna goes to the screen door to see both antagonists already stood in the hallway. 
They have been driven there, seemingly, by Rolfi the dog. They then proceed to 
outstay their welcome. There is an indefinable unease as the boys perform what 
amounts to a Garfinkel- like (1967) breaching experiment. Their requests, whilst not 
immediately unreasonable, are outside of the usual interaction of host and guest. They 
are repeated pinpricks at the thin carapace of social convention before a golf club is 
driven through it. We see the beginnings of the passage from, in Dufourmantelle’s 
exquisite phrasing, that ‘unbearable orb of intimacy’ to a state of hatred (Derrida 
2000: 4). That initial interaction – an invitation to cross the threshold and the offer of 
help – brings into focus the Derridean reading of the ‘unconditional injunction’ to 
provide hospitality (cited in Geyh, 2011: 108).  
 
 We might point to the house being ‘the most primitive drawing of a line that 
produces an inside opposed to an outside’. That line is breached in myriad ways 
(Wigley 1996: 104). It is how the ‘house[…]pretends to afford the utmost security 
while opening itself to the secret intrusion of terror’ (Vidler 1992: 11). Where the 
demarcations might be clear, the boundary lines themselves are porous. They are 
subject to confusion and probing. It is useful here to reference Lacan’s notion of 
extimité (Dolar 1991). Finding no French analogue for uncanny (linguistically tied, as 
it is, to the unhomely, the doubled and the unkennable), Lacan suggested that extimité 
could describe the confusion of internal and external states that float through it. To 
give examples within a domestic setting, Lefebvre (1991), for example, describes the 
networks running through homes. The home, in this reading, is made up of the 
conjunction of countless nodal points. For example, there are telecommunications and 
utilities that puncture that clear demarcating line of inside and out. Gas and electricity 
lines run through walls, under floors and within ceilings. Our wi-fi signals permeate 
our homes and those of others. Homes become singular knots in the wider social 
rhizome, as individual flats stack up to make tower blocks and houses make streets. 
Each are criss-crossed by such lines and flows of energies. Those central tenets of 
Haneke’s work: immigration, terrorism and cultural identity themselves relate to the 
puncturing of the line separating internal and external at individual through to 
international levels. The home becomes the locus for the analysis of these issues in his 
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work. This brings us to the idea of hospitality being a consideration of ‘property, 
sovereignty and control’2 (Geyh 2011: 108). In this sense, following Geyh (2011), 
there must first be a host within their home/property/sovereign nation who can offer 
hospitality to an outsider. They can, or rather must, have some control over the guest 
in order to maintain the integrity of the home: ‘a bad guest [may] result in the 
displacement, undermining or destruction of everything – and everyone – in the house’ 
(Geyh 2011: 108). Or, as Derrida (2000: 54/5) put it:  
 
I want to be master at home … to be able to receive whomever I like 
there. Anyone who encroaches on my ‘at home’, on my ipseity, on my 
power of hospitality, on my sovereignty as host, I start to regard as an 
undesirable foreigner, and virtually as an enemy. This other becomes a 
hostile subject, and I risk becoming their hostage.        
 
So, a threat to home becomes a threat to selfhood and individuality. The 
boundaries between domestic space and individuality are also blurry. An attack on 
one is an attack on both.  
 
There is an onus on the host to regulate the guest. This might well prove 
contrary to the unconditional injunction to provide hospitality. For Derrida, this opens 
up hospitality along two branches: absolute hospitality and conditional hospitality. 
The former requires no knowledge of the outsider. Their anonymity can be complete. 
They need not proffer their social status, nor even their name. They may be truly 
unknown. A conditional hospitality may see the host enquiring after the guest’s names. 
There is power in this. This allows the host to maintain the integrity of the house: ‘in 
telling me what your name is, in responding to this request, you are responding on 
your own behalf, you are responsible before the law and before your hosts, you are 
subject in law’ (Derrida 2000: 27). This is toyed with by the antagonists of Funny 
Games. They are floating signifiers. They knowingly play with this and how it 
disrupts the expected narrative structure of the film. Their names flit between Catholic 
saints (Peter and Paul) and cartoon characters (using both Hanna Barbera’s Tom and 
Jerry, as well as MTV’s Beavis and Butthead). Further, it means that the conditional 
hospitality offered by the host – dependant on knowing a name – is fatally 
undermined. Now, they are unknowable before the law and therefore outside of 
responsibility. The ability to discriminate is taken from the host. The path is set for 
the host (and their family) to transform ‘from a host into a hostage’ (Kearney 2003: 
68). Hospitality and hostility are elided. 
 
Yet, what should the nature, shape, or scope of the control to be enacted by the 
host look like? Derrida (2000: 51) asks ‘should one hand over one’s guests to 
criminals, rapists or murderers? or lie to them so as to save the people one is putting 
up and for whom one feels responsible?’. This is the question that prompts the 
climactic siege in Peckinpah’s (1971) Straw Dogs. It also prompts Lot to offer his 
virgin daughters to a murderous, raping mob in the city of Sodom when they demand 
to have his angelic guests released to them. In both cases, the hospitality offered to the 
Other threatens the integrity of the familial relationships within the home whilst 
privileging the safety of the guest(s).  
 
 A conflicted ipseity combines with an external force that further threatens it3. 
However, as should be clear by now, the externality of that threat is questionable. As 
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Derrida (cited in Geyh 2011: 11) puts it, ‘the Other is already inside, and has to be 
sheltered and welcomed in a certain way’. The home is porous. It is also the 
audience’s gaze that punctures the walls to look at the home of the protagonists. 
However, in Funny Games it is the antagonists’ look that breaks the fourth wall and 
gazes back at us. 
 
 
Breaking the fourth wall: implicating the audience in on-screen violence 
 
Much has been written relating to an audience’s look with regard to violence 
(Sontag 2003; Young 2010). In reference to crime scene or battlefield photography, a 
central question revolves around the right of the audience to look. Sontag (2003: 37) 
suggests that there are those with the ability to change the material conditions of those 
affected, to ‘alleviate’ the pain of the violence inflicted by the look. The rest are 
simply voyeurs: ‘whether or not we mean to be’ (Sontag 2003: 37). In a key phrase, 
Sontag (2003: 99) labels these ‘consumers of violence as spectacle’ or ‘adepts of 
proximity without risk’. With Funny Games there are various techniques used to 
implicate the audience beyond consumption or voyeurism. These are ways of pushing 
past the cynicism that Sontag talks about in an effort to force the audience into a self-
reflexivity relating to the violence that they are watching. They are not allowed to 
simply observe. Rather, the audience is provoked into responding. 
  
At several points during Funny Games, Paul breaks the fourth wall. He 
directly addresses the audience. He asks them to comment on the action or questions 
their expectations. The film concludes with a freeze frame. Paul’s face is turned to us, 
framed by the doorway of another unsuspecting and hospitable family. This look 
through the screen challenges the audience’s gaze. It highlights the degree to which 
an audience is complicit with the on-screen action. Perhaps complicity is insufficient. 
Rather, there is an intimacy to these asides. There is the suggestion of collusion 
between antagonist and viewer. As with much genre fare, we know more than the 
protagonist. Here though, there is a shared awareness of the cinematic world between 
the antagonist and viewer. Both know what is going on and what is coded to happen. 
Paul is merely providing what the audience expects and desires. The safe distance 
between spectator and action is collapsed. As Aaron (2007: 92) puts it, ordinarily a 
disavowal exists that ‘represents a contract between spectator and screen; a contract 
that sustains the safety of the spectator, licensing a safe indulgence in the unreal’. 
That disavowal melts away under Paul’s toxic gaze. Perhaps it is rather simplistic to 
be reminded of the tagline to Last House on the Left: ‘to avoid fainting keep repeating, 
it’s only a movie, only a movie, only a movie’. We know full well that Funny Games 
is a film. However, it has seeimingly left the diegetic space and invaded the viewer’s 
home. 
 
 This particular interaction between antagonist and audience has echoes of the 
Grand Guignol theatrical tradition. Reaching its peak of popularity during the two 
World Wars, the Theatre du Grand-Guignol (1897-1962) was typified by sensational 
horror. In their history of Grand Guignol, Hand and Wilson (2002: 37) suggest that 
direct address was used to ‘implicate the audience and so intensify the horror.’ In so 
doing, this marked a shift from ‘any pretence to naturalism’ to ‘stylized melodrama’ 
(Hand and Wilson 2002: 37). As an aside, Haneke directed the family in Funny 
Games to play tragedy and the boys to play comedy. The clash sees, if not, 
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melodrama with its attendant heightened emotion and (a knowing) sensationalism, but 
rather a Pinter-esque comedy of menace.  
 
Clearly there is a difference between direct address within the theatre and on 
film. Sharing the same physical performance space as the actors will mean that direct 
address acquires a different quality. However, I would argue that the assumed shared 
domesticity of the on-screen home and the situated viewing experience of the viewer 
goes some way to mitigate against this. Perkins (2005 cited in Brown 2012: xi) insists 
that for the cinematic direct addressee ‘there is no camera in their world’. This 
suggests that the projection screen acts as an aperture between worlds. It is a point of 
ingress and egress, as porous as any of the homes that are invaded. This renders the 
uncanniness of the invasion into the viewer’s home all the more acute. Alternatively, 
Funny Games would suggest that Paul is very much aware of the camera within his 
world. Paul is aware of the ‘filmness’ of Funny Games, its genre tropes and 
conventions. An alternative consideration would be to question the ‘character-ness’ of 
Paul. As Brown (2012: 9) puts it: 
 
where Willemen uses ‘imaginary’ in its Lacanian sense to designate 
the subject of the look at the audience, I would prefer ‘symbolic’; it is 
symbolic of the film-text or filmmaker’s attitude towards the viewer’s 
role. 
 
 In this sense, they are vehicles for the director. And, as Brown (2012: 26) 
suggests, ‘Haneke’s extra-textual discourse makes [his] intention clear. He has stated 
that he wished to “rape the viewer into autonomy”’. This, in turn, matches with Augé 
(1999: 3), in that the passivity of the viewer causes them to identify with ‘the camera 
eye and with the projector or, to be more precise, with the entire process of screening 
which constitutes the film’. We will return to the production process later, but to 
develop the discussion of direct address, Brown differentiates between the twin 
practices of distanciation and instanciation. The former speaks to formal techniques 
that distance the viewer from the action. They seek to challenge genre convention and 
codes. The rewinding of the film, thereby denying the revenge of the family and a 
welcome resolution is an example of such a technique. There is no outlet, no moment 
of catharsis, for the audience. Their trauma becomes enduring. Brown (2012: 16), 
however, reframes this rewinding of the film as ‘instanciation’ where it is read as ‘a 
term that suggests the present-ness and immediacy of direct address’. For Brown 
(2012: 28/9) 
 
Haneke’s practice here differs from that of Brecht because the latter 
wished to make the viewer active in imagining alternatives (political 
and/or narrative), while Haneke seeks, rather, to victimise and 
condemn and use our passivity as removed spectators against us. 
  
In addition to the ways in which the antagonist crosses over into our space 
outside of the film, there are formal cinematic techniques that Haneke employs to 
draw the viewer more closely to the diegetic world. Rhodes (2010) points to the 
effects of long-takes and depth-of-focus cinematography to prompt or provoke 
responses in the audience. Drawing on Bazin (1971/2002), Rhodes (2010) points to 
the more ‘realistic’ nature of depth-of-focus photography. We can take the ten minute 
sequence following the killing of the couple’s child as an exemplar. The camera 
 7 
remains locked in position, taking in the living room. The image on the blood-
spattered television changes, but our attention is drawn first to the shuffling of Anna. 
Bound, she struggles to move across the room to her husband who is not yet visible 
behind a sofa. It is perhaps at this point, as our eyes flick over the screen, that we see 
the body of Schorschi. It is the Barthesian punctum. So, it is not the framing of the 
shot, nor the editing of the action that determine what we see, don’t see or unsee. 
Rather, it is us. We are ‘forced to discern’ (Bazin 1971/2002 cited in Rhodes 2010: 
89): we ‘must scrutinise the image, deconstruct it, consider the margins and borders of 
the frame, and “contemplate” the structure of representational strategies that informed 
the creation of this image’ (Wheatley 2009: 93).  
 
 So, the direct address of the look of the antagonist renders us complicit whilst 
the ‘instanciation’ of the rewinding of the film critiques us for our passivity. In one 
instance, the aperture between reel and real worlds is vanishingly thin, whereas with 
the other, we have the mechanism of the film itself used to condemn us for our 
inaction. As Gerbaz (2011: 169) puts it, ‘viewers are being reminded, by Paul and by 
Haneke himself, that this whole ordeal, this spectacle of suffering, has been 
constructed for our benefit’. The violence that occurs does so ‘only because the 
audience expects it’ (emphasis added Wheatley 2009: 96).  
 
 
The performance of violence   
 
 The majority of the violence during Funny Games occurs off-screen. We do 
not see Rolfi being killed. We simply watch him flop lifelessly from the back of the 
family car. Schorschi is shot whilst we watch Paul make a sandwich. Georg is stabbed 
whilst we focus on Anna’s jarringly ecstatic expression. He too is finally shot off-
camera. Anna is pushed out of the frame. She drowns unseen.  
 
Violence passes unobserved. An edit reveals a fresh bruise or a puffy tear-
sodden face. Laine (2010) points to the lengthy close-ups on the parents’ faces. They 
become ‘the sites of pain and shame for being tortured and humiliated up to the point 
where both move beyond humiliation, dwelling in a trancelike state’ (Laine 2010: 52). 
This latter observation has clear echoes of Bataille’s (1989) reading of an image of 
slow slicing or death by a 1000 cuts.  
  
This returns us to a consideration of the performance of violence. Again, there 
are echoes of Grand Guignol. Somewhat counter to popular conceptions, Hand and 
Wilson (original emphasis 2002: 49) describe Grand Guignol as ‘not a theatre of the 
seen, but the unseen horror, a theatre of restraint rather than the blood-fest it has been 
presumed to have been’. For Nevitt (2013), a creative collaboration occurs between 
actor and audience to allow that which is unseen to be seen within the imagination of 
the audience. Mise en scène, auditorium and imagination become spaces to 
‘contemplate violence’ (Nevitt 2013: 6). The spatial arrangement of the stage itself in 
Grand Guignol likewise prompted an intimacy between performer and audience. The 
Grand Guignol stage was relatively small. Plays within this form were rendered 
claustrophobic, thematically as well as spatially. We see this effect mirrored in Funny 
Games. It is perhaps not so much that the fourth wall is broken so much that it comes 
to envelope us in the walls of our own homes. We are provoked into our own 
unbearable intimacy with the action. On occasion, ‘Haneke positions the camera 
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alongside the characters:  we literally seem to be watching alongside them’ (Wheatley 
2011: 18). As we sit and watch, we see the family’s TV screen (latterly blood 
spattered), we are mirrored – or we mirror – the family and antagonists sat together on 
their sofas.  
 
 The audience of the film enter a similar relationship with the film-as-text itself. 
We begin from a position of passivity. We are subject to a ‘unilateral violence’ 
(Cavarero 2011: 30). Given Haneke’s desire to ‘rape the viewer into autonomy’, there 
is no parity or reciprocity. We are subject to the film. Haneke and his antagonists exist 
in a ‘position of omnipotence’ (Cavarero 2011: 30). Is our only option to really walk 
away from a film that has already crossed into our viewing space? How much fun is 
this funny game? 
 
 This question re-focuses our attention to the unpleasure of a viewing 
experience. Wheatley (2009) cites Wollen (1982) in the opposition between 
‘entertainment’ and ‘provocation’. In this instance it is precisely the tension between 
the two states that prompts the ethical reflection in the audience. From the opening 
sequence of the smiling family driving along, Funny Games draws upon the genre 
codes and thematic frameworks that it will later upend. In Wheatley’s (2009: 83) 
playful phrasing, ‘the family are recognisable as the identikit of fable and fairy tale 
(father bear, mummy bear, baby bear)’. And, let us not forget, in Southey’s (1837) 
original of The Story of the Three Bears through to the more widely known 
Goldilocks, the bears successfully repel their indecisive intruder. The thriller elements 
that follow ‘appear as quotes’ (Haneke nd cited in Wheatley 2011: 11). There is the 
framing of the knife on the boat: the everyday object that will be turned on the 
aggressor in the third act. Similarly, there are several escapes. Haneke (nd cited in 
Wheatley 2011: 11) describes Schorschi’s attempt as ‘very classical, like Hitchcock’. 
Further, the one-dimensionality of the family is, itself, a function of thriller codes. 
Their purpose is to suffer. The unpleasure comes from the codes being played with 
and the audience being confronted with an element of violence little seen in thrillers: 
consequence. For example, the ten minute single shot sequence following the son’s 
murder presents us with an over-determined image, as discussed earlier, but also 
forces the consideration of a ‘scenario unfamiliar in the suspense thriller genre: 
potential grief not as a motivation for revenge, but as a pure state of being’ (Wheatley 
2009: 106). 
 
Wheatley (2009) suggests that unpleasure comes form the choice the audience 
is being called upon to make. Here the clash is between the emotional desire for 
pleasure and the intellectual recognition that a moral response is required. I would 
argue that this is further problematized by the viewing experience itself. The place of 
the film’s consumption itself calls into question its consumption. There is far greater 
control over the film in one’s own home. We can pause, rewind, fast forward and 
eject. We can apply our own editorial hand. One of the central difficulties that John 
McNaughton’s (1986) Henry Portrait of a Serial Killer encountered in receiving 
home video certification in the UK was precisely based on this issue.  
 
 A home invasion sequence exists within Henry and was excised from all 
versions released in the UK between 1991 and 2003 (Kimber 2011). It featured Henry 
and his partner Otis breaking into a house, seemingly at random, and murdering a 
family (as with Funny Games, a mother, father and son). However, ‘[t]owards the end 
 9 
of the scene it is revealed that the viewer is not witnessing the events in real time, but 
is in fact watching Henry and Otis’s home-made “snuff-movie” on their TV back in 
Otis’s apartment, after the event and with the killers’ (Kimber 2011: 101). As Kimber 
(2011: 107) puts it, we are ‘formally and thematically positioned[…]alongside Henry 
and Otis’. They watch the killings as entertainment. Otis pauses, rewinds and re-
watches the sequence in slow motion. As with Funny Games, there is a conscious 
artifice at work here. Yet, the British Board of Film Classification examiners’ report 
(cited in Kimber 2011: 35) stated that  
 
The effect of a film within a film here is not to distance it but rather 
through the home movie feel, give the impression that this could be 
located anywhere, including one’s own home[…]By these devices 
viewers are invited to participate, to see the titillatory nature of such 
cruelty and the film is therefore truly exploitative. 
 
As Falcon (1998 cited in Wheatley 2011: 17) states, having a ‘domestic 
viewing context’ lends an ‘added layer of oppression to a film dealing with a family 
trapped and tormented within a domestic environment’. In Funny Games, we are 
formally and thematically placed within the home (as well as our own), but whose 
side do we take? We are positioned alongside both antagonist and protagonist at 
various points. The antagonist looks out into our home. When Paul ‘reverses’ the film, 
the sound distorts as though the film tape itself is being spooled backwards in a player 
(in the later remake, both the picture and sound break apart digitally, as though 
scrubbing a DVD backwards). It is our television that is scrubbing the film backwards.  
 
 
PULL BACK: production context 
 
 The production context of Funny Games also speaks to the broader themes of 
extimité and the porousness of borders. The Austrian Haneke worked with a German 
cast in an Italian location. Price and Rhodes (2010) point to Haneke’s year and 
country of birth (1942, Austria) as offering a ‘rather convenient, possibly 
overdetermined context for thinking about his cinema’s meditation on human 
violence and historical trauma’. Caché (2005), pre-dating Funny Games U.S., and 
Das Weisse Band (2009) post-dating it, are centrally concerned with a particularly 
European history of violence. Wheatley (2009: 21) explicitly goes further as 
suggesting that the depiction of violence (its ramifications and representation) 
references ‘Austria’s elephant in the corner: the country’s complicity with the Nazi 
regime’. The violence itself takes on a fascistic quality: ‘chilling, cold and calculated, 
rather than cathartic’ (Wheatley 2009: 21). It takes place – most often off-camera – in 
the living rooms of “polite society”. In fact, these are the same types of living rooms 
in which the films are likely to be watched. Protagonists and audience are alike the 
‘self-described liberals’ or ‘in a derogatory term “Spiessburger”’ (Speck 2010: 15). 
 
 The invading Other’s position as outsider allows them to offer critique of 
these groups. Derrida (2000: 5) evokes Plato in stating that ‘it is often the foreigner 
(xenos) who questions’. It is certainly the case that in Funny Games the antagonists’ 
ambiguous outsider status is used to critique the bourgeois family (McCann and Sorfa 
2011). This is something of a trope of the genre. It appears, for example, with 
particularly vicious force in The Last House of the Left (1972, dir W Craven; Fiddler 
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2013; Lowenstein 2005). As Sharrett (2010: 216) puts is, ‘the external threat to the 
bourgeois couple may be read as an exteriorization of the deep internal strife of 
bourgeois married life’. Likewise, Haneke (cited in Justice 2011: 102) has argued that 
this particular family are ‘trapped in a sense by their bourgeois notions and 
accoutrements, not just by the killers alone’. 
 
Herein lies an ironic paradox (Galt 2010). If Caché most explicitly (and Funny 
Games offers a thin thread here with its conflict between ‘cosmopolitanism and 
hospitality’) queries the ‘colonial and marginal “others”’, can it do so from a position 
as an artefact of cultural centrality (Galt 2010: 222)? It questions the borders, both 
historically and contemporaneously, but is itself a product with ‘a strong association 
with European power and privilege’ (Galt 2010: 222). To back up slightly, this wider 
context of European film production merits elaboration. The context of Haneke, his 
films and their production alike, is of a Europe whose borders are in constant flux. In 
Galt’s apposite phrasing, we can picture a Europe ‘doubled by the fall of Euro-
communism…its shape, definition and centre of gravity repeatedly revised over the 
course of twenty years’ (emphasis added, Galt, 2010: 226). It is centrally concerned 
with porous boundaries, liminal geopolitical spaces, definitions of exteriority, 
interiority and the construction of transient Others. As Mulvey (1992: 56) puts it, the 
‘homestead as signifier of stable space’ acquires a particular resonance when placed 
in contrast to ‘nomadism’. So it is that the ‘boundary that secures the cohesive limits 
of the western nation may imperceptibly turn into a contentious internal liminality’ 
(Bhabhba 1990 cited in Vidler 1992: 10-11). For Galt (2010: 226), Haneke’s films 
encode ‘the violent rupture of borders and edges, and the impossibility of inscribing 
European territory in any secure or centred fashion’. Of course, such discussions are 
not limited to Europe. The 2007 remake, produced by a conglomeration of production 
companies based in the US, Austria, Germany, the UK, France and Italy, ‘comes with 
a new set of intertexts’ (Wheatley 2009: 193). 
 
 
Repetition and doubling in Funny Games U.S.   
 
 Released in 2007, Funny Games U.S. is essentially a shot-for-shot remake of 
the 1997 original. Some lines of dialogue differ: Paul, for example, alludes to the 
violence of videogame culture on two occasions. Almost entirely though this is an 
English language doubling of the original. This, however, is not out of keeping for 
Haneke’s work: 
 
Michael Haneke’s films clearly bear the marks of creation by a classic 
auteur: the recurring use of names (George and Ann), stories (the 
breaking down of the basic family unit), plot devices (real or imagined 
traumata, an open ending), motifs (the droning noise of television, 
sudden violence without justification or explanation) and signature 
shots, such as the extreme close-up on objects of ritualised actions 
(preparing breakfast)[…]. 
        (Speck 2011: 49) 
 
 There are various reasons one might posit for a remake of a little seen art 
house film from the late 90s4. The casting could be seen as a means to speak to ‘those 
who need the film’. Alternatively, this is a further layering of the funny game. Rather 
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than attracting a new audience who ‘needed’ the film and would be attracted by the 
Hollywood casting and lack of subtitles, it was seen instead by the self same 
Spiessburger audiences who had watched the original. It is they who would, again, 
subject themselves to the film: as with ‘so many victims of the abject [becoming] its 
fascinated victims – if not its submissive and willing ones’ (Kristeva 1982: 9).  
 
The remake, likewise, is a logical consequence of the genre conventions of the 
piece, as well as the structural ‘rules’ established in the first film. As Price (2010: 43) 
indicates, the film could only ever be re-made ‘as same’. A happy ending, in the style 
of the English language remake of The Vanishing, is already negated by the moment 
of Paul’s re-winding. Whilst the film remains the same, we are left to examine the 
contextual changes. Beney (2008 cited by Speck 2010: 32) suggests that there could 
be a series: ‘“Funny Games Iraq” or “Funny Games China”’ each like the last, each 
prompting an examination of context. A paratextual analysis of the Artificial Eye 
DVD release of the original draws our attention to the hooded figure of Schorschi on 
the sleeve. It evokes the images of Abu Ghraib detainees held between the two films. 
It points to the continued use of torture as both instrument of the State, as well as 
subject of entertainment.  
 
 
WIPE: Playing Funny Games 
 
It is the notion of torture as entertainment that is key. That degree of delight in 
the pain of others is inverted and turned upon us, the viewers. We are no ‘simple 
consumer’ when watching the film (Haneke nd cited in McCann and Sorfa 2011: 4). 
The audience is called upon to commit. We endure or we leave. If we are ‘entertained’ 
by something that, ostensibly, shares the trappings of genre convention, then we are to 
be ‘raped into autonomy’. The use of direct address implicates the audience in 
different ways. Young (2010: 17) makes the observation that  
 
Crimes of violence are conventionally constructed as distant from us 
[…]but the cinematic scene of violence brings such events close to 
us[...]. 
 
 In Funny Games, the antagonists’ direct address to the audience complicates 
this. Just as they break the fourth wall, so – akin to one of Garfinkel’s (1967) 
breeching experiments – the film punctures our world and forces us to consider our 
own response to these depictions of violence. 
 
The film itself is narratively ‘slight’. The protagonists are thinly drawn and the 
antagonists’ motivations are frustratingly opaque. The former, however, points to the 
possibility of an intertextual analysis of Haneke’s broader cinematic project (the 
recurrent use of Ann/a and Georg/e as lead character names, for example), as well as 
those within the genre field itself. The latter points to their roles as floating signifiers 
and a current emphasis placed on violent acts rather than characters (Colavito 2008). 
We can use this particular film then as a framework from which to explore an on-
going confluence of violence, entertainment and spectatorship. A focus on the 
violence of the invasion itself can be pivoted so that we examine less its 
representation, but more the complicity of the audience. The ‘fourth wall’ breaking 
draws these threads together and heightens them. As Young (2010: 24) succinctly 
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puts it, ‘violence is a cinematic staple’. Funny Games meticulously unravels the 
audience expectation that ‘the violence of wrong-doing can be met with violence’ 
(Young 2010: 24). Here that cathartic violence is reversed. It is expunged from the 
film. We are left with the violence of the antagonists. We are left with an 
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1 Cast Funny Games (1997): Anna (Susanne Lothar), Georg (Ulrich Mühe), Schorschi 
(Stefan Clapczynski), Peter (Frank Giering) and Paul (Arno Frisch). 
Cast Funny Games U.S. (2007): Ann (Naomi Watts), George (Tim Roth), Georgie 
(Devon Gearhart), Peter (Brady Corbet) and Paul (Michael Pitt).  
2 These overlap with what Price and Rhodes (2010: 8) identify as recurrent themes 
within Michael Haneke’s work: ‘immigration, terrorism and cultural identity’ 
3 We might be reminded here of Kristeva’s (1982: 4) unpacking of the abject: ‘It 
is[…]what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, 
rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite.’  
4 Wheatley (2009) puts the UK cinema gross for Funny Games at £33,727. 
